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Successful implementation of a randomized clinical trial (RCT) for neuro-vascular emergen-
cies such as cerebral infarction, intracerebral hemorrhage, or subarachnoid hemorrhage
is extraordinarily challenging. Besides establishing an accurate, hyper-expedited diagnosis
among many mimics in a person with acute neurological deﬁcits, informed consent must
be obtained from this vulnerable group of patients who may be unable to convey their
own wishes, grasp the gravity of their situation, or give a complete history or examination.
We review the inﬂuences, barriers, and factors investigators encounter when providing
established and putative stroke therapies, and focus on informed consent, the most impor-
tant research protector of human subjects, as the rate-limiting step for enrollment into
acute stroke RCTs. The informed consent process has received relatively little attention
in the stroke literature, but is especially important for stroke victims with acute cognitive,
aural, lingual, motor, or visual impairments. Consent by a surrogate may not accurately
reﬂect the patient’s wishes. Further, confusion about trial methodology, negative opinions
of placebo-controlled studies, and therapeutic misconception by patients or surrogates
may impede trial enrollment and requires further study. Exception from informed consent
offers an opportunity that is rarely if ever utilized for stroke RCTs. Ultimately, advancing
the knowledge base and treatment paradigms for acute stroke is essential but autonomy,
beneﬁcence (non-malfeasance), and justice must also be carefully interwoven into any
well-designed RCT.
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Neuro-vascular emergencies, including cerebral infarction, intrac-
erebral hemorrhage (ICH), and subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH),
are arguably the most difﬁcult medical conditions in which to
successfully construct and implement a randomized clinical trial
(RCT). First, an accurate, hyper-expedited stroke diagnosis must
be established among a large array of potential mimics in a patient
with acute neurological deﬁcits, based on an incomplete his-
tory, limited examination, and imperfect neuroimaging. Second,
informed consent must be obtained from potentially vulnera-
ble patients who are often suddenly unable to convey their own
wishes, communicate with physicians and family, or compre-
hend the gravity of their situation. Third, both established and
putative acute therapies must be administered rapidly to maxi-
mize their potential beneﬁts. Extensive research has focused on
improving stroke diagnosis and on developing systems to opti-
mize the timely delivery of treatment to stroke patients. However,
the issue of informed consent in stroke trials has received rela-
tively little attention, yet it is often the rate-limiting step in RCTs
of acute stroke therapy. Clinical trials involving potential treat-
ments for stroke, as well as many other neurological emergencies,
face a cluster of unique challenges to informed consent that likely
contribute to the consistently slow recruitment pace of these tri-
als (The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke
Rt-PA Stroke Study Group, 1995; Alexandrov, 2006; Elkins et al.,
2006).
Voluntary informed consent, authorized by a competent, alert,
informed individual, has been the ethical foundation of human
research for decades in the Belmont Report, published in 1979
(National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979; Beauchamp, 2004).
Informed consent has been labeled the “most important protec-
tor” of human subjects in research (Prentice, 1999). The process
of informed consent must include a description of the precise
objectives of the RCT, its methods and procedures, its risks and
discomforts (known and unknown), liability in case of injury,
alternatives to participation, plans for use of personal and pri-
vate information, discontinuation options (for the subject and for
the sponsor or investigators), and the promise of possible beneﬁt.
To give informed consent, a person must at the time of consent be
18 years of age or older, possess adequate reasoning faculties, and
clearly understand the facts, implications,and future consequences
of their decision (Food and Drug Administration, 1996; Marwick,
1997; Adams andWegener, 1999; Biros et al., 1999; Prentice, 1999;
Morris et al., 2004; Kasner et al., 2009, 2010). Subjects who lose
their autonomy due to acute stroke-related cognitive impairment
require special consideration and additional protections. Without
autonomy, a subject cannot understand the risks and beneﬁts of a
RCT nor provide informed consent for trial enrollment. Notably,
patients with the most severe ischemic strokes are the least likely
to beneﬁt from currently available thrombolytic therapy and are
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also the least likely to be able to provide their own consent to trial
participation (Flaherty et al., 2008).
In addition to autonomy, beneﬁcence/non-malfeasance, and
justice together triangulate ethical trial design (Burrows and
Hodgson, 1997). Beneﬁcence in clinical trials refers to the goal
of promoting the best interest and health of study subjects. This
principlemay conﬂictwith autonomy,asmay occurwhen a patient
has no viable standard treatment options yet is incapacitated from
making a decision about an experimental intervention. Justice
requires that research subjects are treated fairly and not placed
at a disadvantage or faced with excessive risk. Patients with severe
strokemust not be givenmore or less opportunity to participate in
RCTs than those withminor strokes. Again, thismay be a challenge
when there is loss of autonomy. Justice also refers to a social jus-
tice for the community of subjects with the medical problem, for
whom the researchmust be timely and relevant. Ultimately, auton-
omy, beneﬁcence/non-malfeasance, and justice in a well-designed
RCT make the RCT itself potentially highly valuable both to the
individual and to society (Burrows andHodgson, 1997). Exclusion
of patients who are unable to provide their own consent for stroke
RCTs undoubtedly impacts both validity and generalizability of
the results and thereby limits the value of such a RCT, not to men-
tion its progress. Thus, to overcome this obstacle, and advance
the knowledge base and treatment paradigms for acute stroke,
improved and alternative approaches to the consent process must
be sought (Table 1).
TIME PRESSURE
Acute neuro-vascular brain injury will lead to irreversible dam-
age without rapid intervention. As with standard therapy such
as thrombolysis for ischemic stroke, there is also extraordinary
time pressure for trial enrollment, which requires an acceler-
ated approach to the process of informed consent itself. For the
acute stroke patient, arrival in the emergency department is fol-
lowed quickly by questions from healthcare professionals, physical
and neurological examinations and evaluations, blood draws, and
urgent neuroimaging. The patient will be offered standard acute
therapies if appropriate and learn rapidly about their potential
beneﬁts and risks.Amid all of this rampage, the patientmay be ver-
bally offered participation in a trial but givenmereminutes to read
the trial’s informed consent document, understand it,mull it over,
and make a decision about participation. The narrow time win-
dows for standard therapy, informed consent, decision-making,
randomization, and study drug administration, are often prohibi-
tive.As there aremany personal,medical, sociocultural, emotional,
spiritual, and legal factors involved in giving informed consent for
a RCT, patients should be able consider their options thought-
fully. When asked about the time allotted to make such a decision
for a stroke trial, 30min was deemed sufﬁcient for only 56% of
respondents (Del Giudice et al., 2009). Subjects were more likely
to participate if they felt that they had enough time, though many
wished they hadmore time and opportunity to discuss their choice
with others. In order to augment enrollment, investigators should
make every effort to start the consent process as early as possible,
in order to allocate more than just a few pressurized moments for
the potential subject to make what could be the biggest decision
of his or her life.
RESEARCH INSIGHT AND LITERACY
Potential study subjectsmay have an incomplete, imperfect under-
standing of the proposed trial and its key concepts, even if cog-
nitively normal (Kasner et al., 2009, 2010). The typical informed
consent form for a stroke trial ranges from 8 to 16 pages, depend-
ing on numerous factors but most prominently the risks and
invasiveness of the intervention and the policies of the institu-
tion. While attempts are reliably made to use 10th grade or lower
reading levels, consent forms are nevertheless laden with med-
ical jargon and other information that is often quite new for
the reader. Illiteracy in general remains a problem in the U.S.
but is widespread in developing countries, and medical illiter-
acy is a major global challenge for clinical research.(Lynoe et al.,
1998; Kilmarx et al., 2001; Marshall, 2006) Patients may con-
ﬂate their standard therapy with the study intervention leading
to further difﬁculty with the overall process.(Lynoe et al., 2004)
Thus, any information given to patients to review for entry into
acute RCTs must be clear, concise, and intended for subjects
with little medical knowledge (Grotta and Bratina, 1995). In
one survey of 685 stroke patients in the post-acute phase (and
their proxies) in 12 hospitals across Italy, education was found
to be the primary sociodemographic determinant of indepen-
dent clinical decision-making (Ciccone et al., 2001). The pref-
erence for thrombolytic therapy, for example, was higher among
more educated people (Ciccone et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the
role of education plays a somewhat questionable role in research
contexts.
In less urgent settings, educational level as well as age, sex,
race/ethnicity, and numerous sociocultural factors have been
reported as probable factors associated with RCT participation
(Marwick, 1997; Adams and Wegener, 1999; Biros et al., 1999;
Prentice, 1999; Lynoe et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2004; Marshall,
2006; Kasner et al., 2009, 2010). However, none of these factors
appeared to be signiﬁcantly associated with the decision to par-
ticipate in RCTs involving cerebral infarction, ICH, or SAH (Del
Giudice et al., 2009; Kasner et al., 2009). This suggests that these
factors may not be directly relevant to giving informed consent in
these clinical situations.
Critical research concepts such as randomization and clin-
ical equipoise are complex and may not be easily interpreted
or appropriately incorporated into the research decision-making
process, particularly when pressed for time. Confusion about the
overall trial design and therapeutic misconception may result.
Potential subjects believe they will get a new medication that
would likely help them, without full realization that they ulti-
mately may be better off in the placebo or standard therapy arm
of the trial. In both structured interviews and in focus groups
involving people either at risk for or with prior stroke or trau-
matic brain injury, participants expressed that in the face of
an acute neurological catastrophe, “experimental treatment must
be better than nothing” (Kasner et al., 2010). When confronted
with the possibility of not receiving the investigational agent
(i.e., given placebo) one said, “I think everyone should get the
treatment, I mean that’s not fair. You’re allowing people to be
experimented upon and not giving them a fair shot of taking
a risk” (Kasner et al., 2010). Participants consistently had nega-
tive opinions of placebo-controlled studies and described feelings
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Table 1 | Advantages and disadvantages of various modalities of informed consent for stroke trials.
Consent modality Advantages Disadvantages
Traditional: in-hospital
physician–patient dialog with
written document
Most well-recognized modality Not feasible directly with incapacitated patient
Highest comfort level with patients and proxies Document/discussion may be long and complex
Preserved patient autonomy Time pressure at maximum after hospital arrival
Full documentation offered, all issues discussed, all questions
answered
Selection bias for those who survive to hospital or
improve en route
Proxy for incapacitated patients often arrives late
Paramedics: on-scene consent
by emergency medical
technicians
Early implementation by ﬁrst responders. Not feasible directly with incapacitated patient
Family more likely to be present on site for proxy consent (if
needed) than after transport to hospital
Consent elicitation may distract paramedics and
impede pre-hospital care
Successful use in prior emergency trials (i.e., pre-hospital
thrombolysis for myocardial infarction)
Paramedics must complete/maintain required certi-
ﬁcation in research ethics
Less selection bias for patients with capacity at scene that is
lost upon hospital arrival
Non-physician investigators may lack expertise in
diagnosis, experimental therapy, or stroke
pathophysiology, and may have difﬁculty answering
patient questions
Validity of this process may be unrecognized
May be deemed unacceptable by emergency med-
ical system governance
Exception from informed
consent: no suitable means to
obtain consent
Early enrollment Formidable regulatory requirements and burdens
Feasible with incapacitated patient Minimal prior use in stroke research
May be deemed unacceptable by community
“Short form”: abbreviated initial
written document
Easy to read and sign quickly by patient or proxy in the ﬁeld,
saving time upon hospital arrival
Physician–investigator not present for initial consent
review and to answer questions
Critical aspects of study highlighted Incomplete understanding of study at initiation
Early enrollment Repetitive language in ﬁnal document (re-reading)
No major extra duties asked of paramedics Potential for subject dropout upon learning full
details after hospital arrivalFull-length form reviewed upon hospital arrival
Telephone: physician–investigator
cell phone elicitation of consent
All issues discussed, all questions answered but without full
documentation until hospital arrival
Need to have on-call physicians in cell phone range
for call response
Early enrollment Call abandonment due to poor audio reception
No major extra duties asked of
paramedics
May not have full history, exam, or
inclusion/exclusion criteria by phone
Full-length form reviewed upon hospital arrival May take longer than other modalities due to lack
of face-to-face contact, siren noise, and various
interruptions on both ends
Validity of this process may be questioned
Tele-stroke:
physician–investigator video
elicitation of consent
All issues discussed, all questions answered but without full
documentation until hospital arrival
Need to have on-call physicians at a computer with
internet
Early enrollment Call abandonment due to poor video reception
Visualization of patient for history and exam Validity of this process may be questioned
Full-length form reviewed upon hospital arrival
of being “left out” if not given experimental treatment (Kasner
et al., 2010). This therapeutic misconception may have been cul-
tivated by a misunderstanding of supportive care, in that it is still
the standard of care. Conversely, when considering an alterna-
tive RCT design comparing two active treatments, subjects then
said they did not feel “deprived of treatment” (Kasner et al.,
2010).
Thus, concerted public education as well as rapid counseling
in the acute setting may improve comprehension of these key
concepts and thereby improve research participation. Community
outreach campaigns also may encourage more people to consider
participating in a stroke RCT, should they or their loved ones suffer
from thismalady. Naturally, any stroke awareness information ses-
sions must be developed in a straightforward, culturally sensitive
way, without undue inﬂuence, ﬁnancially, socially, or otherwise.
The aim is not to deemphasize the role of informed consent or the
physician–patient interaction,but instead to enhance the decision-
making process. This is accomplished by having potential enrollees
and their families preemptively identify with the concept of a RCT,
its generation, function, goal, and signiﬁcance. Such a campaign
could help demystify the prospects of a RCT before a stroke ever
happens.
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LOSS OF DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY
Stroke victims’ acute cognitive, aural, lingual, motor, or visual
impairments can partially or completely render them unable to
take part in the informed consent process. This issue is fairly
unique to neuro-vascular trials, as RCTs involving other types of
disorders, even in an emergency situation, seldom encounter acute
brain dysfunction that removes subjects’ capacity for informed
consent. Indeed, loss of autonomy is often the rule than the excep-
tion, with only 30% of subjects in some stroke RCTs being able
provide their own consent prior to enrollment (Flaherty et al.,
2008). Some researchers seriously doubt the validity of acute
stroke patients’ informed consent when at the nadir of their ill-
ness because even stroke victims who recover rapidly have a foggy
recollection of their event (Grotta and Bratina, 1995).
Loss of capacity to give informed consent has also been linked
to increasing age and baseline neurological deﬁcit, according to
an analysis of patients enrolled in four urgent therapeutic trials
(Demarquay et al., 2005). Aphasia was the main reason for inabil-
ity to self-consent in 67% of patients. In the third International
stroke trial (IST-3), patients with more severe stroke as well as
those with non-lacunar hemispheric stroke syndromes also were
less likely to have been recruited by their own consent (Kane et al.,
2006). It would be helpful to have a standardized tool to assess
acute stroke patients’ capacity to consent for RCT enrollment, but
currently no such validated or appropriately rapid test exists (Bate-
man et al., 2003). So for the time being, researchers continue to
subjectively estimate each patient’s capacity to give informed con-
sent prior to RCT enrollment and then decide on their own if
surrogate consent is needed.
SURROGATE INFORMED CONSENT
As long as the interests of patients are generally best served by par-
ticipation, research involving incapacitated individuals is ethically
permissible by surrogate informed consent (World Medical Asso-
ciation, 2000, 2004). According to the Declaration of Helsinki,
a document initially adopted in 1964 deﬁning essential ethical
principles guiding clinical research, subjects without capacity to
give informed consent “should not be included in research unless
research is necessary to promote the health of the population
represented and research cannot instead be performed on legally
competent persons”(WorldMedicalAssociation,2000,2004). This
language differs from the 1947NurembergCodeonhuman experi-
mentationwhichmade InformedConsent an“absolutely essential”
requirement (Simmons, 1964; Faden et al., 1996; Dickens, 1999).
Article II of the Declaration of Helsinki stipulates that doctors
should try to acquire consent“if at all possible”but if this is impos-
sible and a surrogate such as a legal guardian is available, then
research is allowed without the patient’s own explicit consent.
In the NINDS trial investigating tissue plasminogen activator
(t-PA) for acute ischemic stroke, surrogate consent was used to
enroll 439 of 624 (70%) of subjects (The National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke Rt-PA Stroke Study Group,
1995; Flaherty et al., 2008). Compared to subjects who provided
their own consent, those enrolled by surrogate consent generally
were about 5 years older, with higher NIH stroke scale (NIHSS)
scores (median 17 versus 9, p < 0.001), and less likely to have a
good recovery (26 versus 53% had a modiﬁed Rankin score of 0–1
at 90 days, p < 0.001; Flaherty et al., 2008). Over a decade later, in
a RCT of pre-hospital acute stroke therapy, (Saver and The FAST-
MAG Investigators, 2011) surrogate-consented subjects were again
found to be older by about 7 years and with higher NIHSS scores
(median 16 versus 6, p < 0.001). A small study from Scotland also
demonstrated that infarct lesion volume on MRI, in addition to
stroke severity, was associated with capacity to consent for acute
stroke trials. (Dani et al., 2008) Stroke lesion burden was greater
for incapable of consent compared to those enrolled by their own
consent. In a registry involving 20 major stroke centers across
Canada, stroke victims with cognitive impairment and/or altered
mental status were excluded and the in-hospital mortality rate
was 6.9% for those who participated and 22% for those who did
not (p < 0.001; Tu et al., 2004). This strongly suggests that those
included in the registrywerenot representative of the typical stroke
population. Together, these studies demonstrate that subjects who
provide their own consent differ substantially from those requir-
ing surrogate consent (Figures 1 and 2). Further, in SAH trials,
only 28% of patients believed they had the capacity to make their
own decision at the time of enrollment (Schats et al., 2003). The
inclusion of subjects with stroke via surrogate consent therefore
dramatically expands the diversity of the study population and
enhances the generalizability of the research.
In the U.S., regulations for surrogate consent in medical
research vary from state to state. In some areas, there are no for-
mal guidelines at all, forcing Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
and investigators to grapple with this issue themselves (Kim and
Karlawish, 2003). Interpretations by IRBs in several states and
countries prohibit surrogate informed consent for research par-
ticipation unless durable power of attorney is furnished (Saver,
1996; Flaherty et al., 2008). However, IRBs in some regions
have been reported to temporarily suspend enrollment by surro-
gate informed consent, demanding legislative clariﬁcation before
resuming such research entry (Flaherty et al., 2008). Reluctance to
allow surrogate informed consent may be particularly prominent
with research that carries substantial risk as opposed to inves-
tigations of more benign interventions (Flaherty et al., 2008).
Some IRBs insist that prior to collecting data, researchers obtain
informed consent from the patient – even though the well-known,
oft-cited, federal privacy law, health insurance portability and
accountability act (HIPAA), permits informed consent waivers
(Kulynych and Korn, 2002). Nevertheless, this and other U.S. fed-
eral statutes do not delineate criteria for someone to be considered
“a legally authorized representative,”so investigators and IRBs con-
tinue to deal with it themselves or seek guidance from state law
(Bateman et al., 2003). On a global scale, there is even greater
variability in the law and its interpretation, and increasingly com-
plex sociocultural issues regarding who can make decisions on
behalf of a patient (Marshall, 2006). While not studied speciﬁ-
cally for stroke trials, there are numerous examples where consent
appeared to be more acceptable by a husband or an elder from
the husband’s family than by a wife (Kilmarx et al., 2001; Decosta
et al., 2004). Yet with the silent or ambiguous laws and sociocul-
tural idiosyncrasies that pepper each individual region, a circle
of chaos emerges about who is authorized to make medical deci-
sions for the incapacitated especially in the acute setting (Saver,
1996; Bateman et al., 2003). Such medico-legal uncertainty can
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship between NIHSS scores and proxy- versus self-consent for acute stroke trials.
FIGURE 2 | Relationship between age and proxy- versus self-consent in
acute stroke trials.
decelerate the development of effective stroke therapy. The RCTs
that only enroll patients who can deﬁnitely give informed consent
will analyze healthier subjects who do not adequately resemble
the clinical spectrum of stroke patients, and thus any conclusions
drawn from such research may be deemed underpowered, unre-
liable, and consequently invalidated (Dani et al., 2008; Flaherty
et al., 2008).
Evenwhen legally authorized representatives are acceptable and
available for decision-making, enrollment into acute stroke RCTs
is still low. When offered a hypothetical stroke trial, only 40%
of surrogates agreed to participation compared to 59% of stroke
patients (Kasner et al., 2009). One explanationmay be that there is
more uncertainty or anxiety about RCT participation among sur-
rogate decision-makers than patients, especially when decisions
are made for a relative (41% of proxies could not reach a deci-
sion versus 17% for self-indecision, p < 0.001) according to one
review (Ciccone et al., 2001). Another study found that zero of
10 patients (0%) declared feeling uncomfortable when giving self-
consent, but seven out of 13 relatives (54%) said the“psychological
stress induced by urgent decision-making” made them uneasy
when providing consent for their family members (Demarquay
et al., 2005). Categorically, stroke patients are muchmore inclined
to participate in a RCT than their proxy decision-makers.
When surrogate decision-makers are not immediately available,
extensive efforts may be required to ﬁnd them, but this can be
tedious. One individual suggested: “Go into my wallet and maybe
I have a phone number in there (or) maybe I have a cell phone and
see if you can call someone” (Kasner et al., 2010). However, there
is typically minimal time to do a thorough search in the setting of
an acute stroke. Further, there is substantial variability in regional
legal statutes and precedents about who may serve as a surrogate
in this context (Saver, 1996; Kulynych and Korn, 2002; Bateman
et al., 2003; Kim and Karlawish, 2003; Flaherty et al., 2008). Even
if someone suitable is found, he or she may not be able to get to
the hospital in time to read, decide, and sign the consent docu-
ment. If a surrogate can only be reached by telephone, many IRBs
reject telephone consent for RCT participation. In one study, only
18% of IRBs allowed surrogate consent to be obtained over the
phone (Leira et al., 2010). However, physician phone elicitation
of informed consent from legally authorized representatives has
been successfully utilized in the pre-hospital setting in the Field
administration of stroke therapy –magnesium (FAST-MAG) trial,
permitting rapid patient study entry, without delaying transport
times (Saver et al., 2006; Sanossian et al., 2010). Further, a suitable
surrogate decision-maker could be identiﬁed but he or she may
not be comfortable making any decision for the patient.
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In the end, a surrogate may not necessarily make a decision
that is consistent with the stroke patient’s own preferences (Kas-
ner et al., 2009, 2010). Whether or not is it fair to tell surrogates
that they may underestimate the patient’s wishes to participate
remains to be put to an ethical test.
EXCEPTION FROM INFORMED CONSENT
Under certain circumstances, such as in emergency situations that
involve acutely neurologically impaired patients, research partic-
ipation is possible without explicit informed consent (Food and
DrugAdministration, 1996). TheU.S. Food andDrugAdministra-
tion (FDA) permits enrollment into trials under their Exception
from informed consent (EFIC) directive, FDA Rule 21 CFR 50.24,
which parallels the Department of health and human services
(DHHS) waiver of Informed Consent Rule 45 CFR 46.101.(Biros
et al., 1999) To qualify a study for EFIC, the following criteriamust
be met:
(i) the subject must be in a life-threatening situation,
(ii) existing therapies are unproven or unsatisfactory,
(iii) unable to obtain informed consent due to the medical
condition, and
(iv) unable to use surrogate consent due to the acuity of the
treatment.
The pathology of the condition need not be immediately life-
threatening, but the condition of the subject must be life-
threatening during the therapeutic window of the investigational
agent, with a high likelihood of patient death or disability unless
the course of the pathology is interrupted (Food andDrugAdmin-
istration, 1996; Marwick, 1997; Adams and Wegener, 1999; Biros
et al., 1999; Prentice, 1999; Morris et al., 2004; Kasner et al., 2009,
2010). There must be no reasonable way, prospectively, to iden-
tify subjects eligible for participation in the RCT. According to
the DHHS rule, current treatments must be declared “unproven
or unsatisfactory,” preclinical studies and related evidence must
“support the potential for the intervention,” and risks associated
with the investigation deemed “reasonable” compared to standard
therapy. The FDA also requires that an independent data safety
monitoring board (DSMB) provide ongoing oversight of all trials
invoking EFIC, regardless of size. Investigators must demonstrate
that their RCT could not practicably be carried out without EFIC.
Good-faith, appropriately documented attempts to locate a proxy
(to avoid proceeding without consent) should be monitored by an
IRB. Lastly, for each EFIC protocol using a drug, device, or biologic
agent, an application for investigational new drug (IND) or inves-
tigational device exemption (IDE) must be submitted. Although
these FDA requisites may appear onerous, the intention of the
EFIC is to protect subjects whom, without a waiver, would not
participate in any research at all and hence forgo the potential
beneﬁt offered by scientiﬁc advancement.
Before a trial is conducted under EFIC, additional requirements
include community consultation and public disclosure in accord
with 21 CFR 50.24 (Food and Drug Administration, 1996). Com-
munity consultation is not well deﬁned, but should “involve and
engage members of the community in which the research will
take place and members of the community from which prospec-
tive study subjects may be drawn (if these two communities are
not the same). The proposed trial must therefore be openly dis-
cussed with community members who are representative of the
potential study population and the study community” (Food and
Drug Administration, 1996; Kasner et al., 2010). This consultation
fosters a spirit of inclusion for the community,prompting itsmem-
bers to learn about local research and voice concerns about real or
imagined abuses by investigators (Leira et al., 2010). Community
consultationmay be reasonably achieved by individual interviews,
focus groups, town hall meetings, and other forums. A series of
focus groups involving stroke survivors and family members of
stroke victims acknowledged that if there were no other treatment
options available, or if experimental treatment were the last resort,
then their willingness to participate would be high and they would
accept enrollment into a RCTwithout consent under the EFIC reg-
ulations (Blixen andAgich, 2005; Kasner et al., 2009). In particular,
stroke survivors were noted to be well aware of the long-term
sequelae of stroke, the limitations of current therapies, and the
need for more research in acute therapies, which likely made them
more open to EFIC than the general public (Blixen and Agich,
2005). Focus group participants were generally content having
the decision made by their physician or, if necessary, an indepen-
dent committee of physicians and medical ethics experts with the
patient’s best interests in mind. The inclusion of a layperson with
personal experience with stroke may also be helpful, as stroke sur-
vivors have been reported to “exchange information, ideas, and
encouragement . . .my online (stroke survivor) community might
be closer to the mark for me because I share things with them that
my family does not know about because they understand things
that my family does not” (Kasner et al., 2010). One participant
summed it up by saying,“If my situationwere so severe that I really
had no other option, like I had nothing to lose, then I would say
yes”’ (Kasner et al., 2010). Thus, the perceptions of beneﬁcence for
the patient prevailed over autonomy. Of note, focus group partici-
pants were less trusting of emergency medical technicians (EMTs)
than physicians,more leery of an out-of-hospital RCT than a RCT
set up in an emergency room, and thoroughly skeptical that the
general public has enough education or relevant experience to
represent their views on informed consent in these circumstances.
Unequivocally, they did not endorse any other political, religious,
or professional organization as suitable for consultation at all.
The past two decades have seen an upsurge in the interest and
dedication to the study of stroke. However, no RCTs for acute
stroke therapies have utilized EFIC. Practically, EFIC has been dif-
ﬁcult to implement in the U.S. overall, as many people view EFIC
as more ethically problematic than surrogate informed consent
(Salzman et al., 2007). EFIC has been used successfully in other
neuroemergency trials, including theNorthAmericanBrain Injury
Study-Hypothermia, the Progesterone for Traumatic brain injury
Experimental Clinical Treatment, and the Rapid Anticonvulsant
Medications Prior to Arrival Trial for seizures. Although EFIC
remains unused for stroke RCTs, it appears to be an acceptable
option to stroke survivors and their families. Additional research
will further elucidate the utility, efﬁciency, and satisfaction of com-
munity consultation and public disclosure activities for stroke and
other neuroemergency trials.
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Nevertheless, for stroke victims, EFIC may represent their best
chance to participate in research. In a emergency department-
based survey involving a hypothetical stroke trial, 55% of eligi-
ble respondents were willing to be enrolled into a RCT without
informed consent, and an independent predictor to participate
was if a greater than 50% chance of full recovery was deemed
possible (Goldstein et al., 2010).
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE
Few studies have attempted to quantitatively assess the proportion
of people whowould be willing to participate in acute stroke trials.
Not surprisingly, the results have been strongly related to the sever-
ity of the stroke and the risk of the proposed intervention. For a
hypothetical trial involving acute SAH, which poses an enormous
threat of death and disability, a survey of emergency department
patients (who did not SAH) found that 76% were likely to par-
ticipate (Del Giudice et al., 2009). A survey of patients and their
surrogates with acute ischemic stroke or ICH found that 57%were
likely to participate in the proposed RCT, though only 50% agreed
if the treatment was potentially dangerous while 90% agreed when
the risk was relatively low (Kasner et al., 2009). Willingness to
participate in a hypothetical trial has been shown to be a valid
predictor of actual participation, and assessment of enrollment
preferences in hypothetical situations rather than in dire emer-
gencies might better reﬂect patients’ genuine interests (Halpern
et al., 2001). Another hypothetical RCT, exploring motivations for
participation, found that personal health beneﬁt, helping others,
and contributing to scientiﬁc knowledgewere the top three reasons
subjects were willing to enroll, while the most common concerns
were the need for medication adjustments (56%), inconvenience
of being in a trial (38%), anxiety of study drug side effects (35%),
and placebo futility (24%; Halpern et al., 2003).
Factors such as age, sex, race, and educational level have not
been shown to bear signiﬁcantly on the decision to participate
in stroke trials (Kasner et al., 2009), although such issues have
not been well explored on an international scale. Notably, prior
exposure to a neurological injury or illness was prominently asso-
ciated with the desire to participate in a RCT, likely due to the
impact of the prior event and the potential subject’s opinion that a
trial intervention could only help them (Kasner et al., 2009, 2010).
Stroke survivors“have a very devil-may-care attitude. . .after we’ve
gone through this” and are often quite eager to try something new
that may not have been an option at the time of the ﬁrst stroke
(Blixen and Agich, 2005; Kasner et al., 2010).
Public outreach campaigns have educated people about stroke
and thereby accelerated hospital arrival times and acute treatments
(Morgenstern et al., 2003). However, attitudes toward and expec-
tations of clinical research are mixed and could be targeted for
similar educational efforts. In one study, acute stroke RCTs were
rated as very positive by 5%, positive by 45%, neutral by 44%,
negative by 5%, and very negative by 2% (Kasner et al., 2009).
One virtually unchangeable obstacle to successful enrollment is a
person’s ﬁxed unassailable concerns about research (i.e., rigid pre-
conceived notions and fears about experimentation, or explicit
demand for non-enrollment). Prior negative attitudes about RCTs
have been shown to markedly impede trial enrollment, and for
some people, this mind-set may not be changed by educational
efforts (Flaherty et al., 2008). However, it remains unknown if this
perspective changes after one experiences the chronic aftermath
of a devastating neurological injury (Marwick, 1997; Adams and
Wegener, 1999; Biros et al., 1999; Prentice, 1999;Morris et al., 2004;
Kasner et al., 2009, 2010).
WILLINGNESS TO ENROLL
In a European study examining physicians’ views of emergency
trials, 218 questionnaires were completed, and attitudes were pre-
dominantly positive (Iwanowski et al., 2008). For the most part,
physicians felt that patients’ trust was not compromised during
emergency research involving stroke or acute coronary syndrome.
Less than 15%of respondents believed that patients fully readwrit-
ten information anyway such as an Informed Consent document,
with 19% hardly reading anything at all (Iwanowski et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, many stroke researchers have called for an inter-
national ethical consensus to mediate consent issues fairly for
both investigators and stroke patients from diverse cultural back-
grounds and various belief systems (Leira et al., 2010). In a survey
about their experience with their local IRBs (or equivalent), 90
stroke researchers from 15 different countries compared their per-
sonal beliefs about the ethics of acute stroke trials with those
of their IRB members. Substantial diversity existed between the
ethical priorities of the researchers and the IRBs with respect to
informed consent standards. For example,usingEFIC for enrolling
a patient with impaired consciousness was acceptable to 41% of
investigators but only 33% of IRB members (Leira et al., 2010).
Similarly, only 36% of IRB members but 62% of investigators felt
that NIHSS score was sufﬁcient to characterize decisional capac-
ity. Perhaps a collaborative effort to attain a standardized, global
informed consent practice could bridge this controversy. Work-
ing toward common ethical standards for acute stroke research
may more rigorously and equally protect subjects across the globe
(Leira et al., 2010).
CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE
The rate-limiting step in acute stroke trials is the process of
informed consent. The majority of people are inclined to partic-
ipate once they have weighed their options, but individuals with
stroke seldom make that choice for themselves. Family members
are more hesitant than patients to consent to trial participation,
and they are often not available to make a well-timed decision.
Despite reasonable laws to waive informed consent, EFIC remains
underutilized for stroke RCTs, though it is deemed an acceptable
option to many stroke survivors and their families. EFIC seems to
be an inevitable part of the solution to expand the population of
stroke patients able to participate and to improve the timeliness
of stroke clinical research. Educational outreach programs are also
needed to reduce confusion about trial methods, negative opin-
ions, and therapeutic misconception. Additional research will fur-
ther elucidate the utility, efﬁciency, and satisfaction of community
consultation and public disclosure activities for stroke and other
neuroemergency trials. Perhaps theultimatemessage for clinician–
investigators designing an acute stroke RCT is to motivate
the public and potential subjects with the hope of improving
outcomes of stroke in their community and throughout the
world.
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 65 | 7
Rose and Kasner Consent in acute stroke trials
REFERENCES
Adams, J. G., and Wegener, J. (1999).
Acting without asking: an eth-
ical analysis of the Food and
Drug Administration waiver of
informed consent for emergency
research. Ann. Emerg. Med. 33,
218–223.
Alexandrov, A. V. (2006). Slow recruit-
ment in clinical trials: failure is not
an option! Int. J. Stroke 1, 160.
Bateman, B. T., Meyers, P. M., Schu-
macher, H. C., Mangla, S., and
Pile-Spellman, J. (2003). Conduct-
ing stroke researchwith an exception
from the requirement for informed
consent. Stroke 34, 1317–1323.
Beauchamp, T. (2004). The legacy and
the future. 30 years after the Belmont
report, Beauchamp sets the record
straight. Prot. Hum. Subj. 1–3.
Biros, M. H., Fish, S. S., and Lewis, R.
J. (1999). Implementing the Food
and Drug Administration’s ﬁnal rule
for waiver of informed consent
in certain emergency research cir-
cumstances. Acad. Emerg. Med. 6,
1272–1282.
Blixen, C. E., and Agich, G. J. (2005).
Stroke patients’ preferences and val-
ues about emergency research. J.
Med. Ethics 31, 608–611.
Burrows, R. C., and Hodgson, R. E.
(1997). De facto gatekeeping and
informed consent in intensive care.
Med. Law 16, 17–27.
Ciccone, A., Sterzi, R., Crespi, V.,
Defanti, C. A., and Pasetti, C. (2001).
Thrombolysis for acute ischemic
stroke: the patient’s point of view.
Cerebrovasc. Dis. 12, 335–340.
Dani,K.A.,Mccormick,M.T., andMuir,
K. W. (2008). Brain lesion volume
and capacity for consent in stroke
trials: potential regulatory barriers
to the use of surrogate markers.
Stroke 39, 2336–2340.
Decosta, A., D’Souza, N., Krishnan, S.,
Chhabra, M. S., Shihaam, I., and
Goswami, K. (2004). Community
based trials and informed consent in
rural north India. J. Med. Ethics 30,
318–323.
Del Giudice, A., Plaum, J., Maloney,
E., Kasner, S. E., Le Roux, P. D.,
and Baren, J. M. (2009). Who
will consent to emergency treat-
ment trials for subarachnoid hem-
orrhage? Acad. Emerg. Med. 16,
309–315.
Demarquay, G., Derex, L., Nighoghoss-
ian, N., Adeleine, P., Philippeau,
F., Honnorat, J., and Trouillas, P.
(2005). Ethical issues of informed
consent in acute stroke. Analysis
of the modalities of consent in 56
patients enrolled in urgent thera-
peutic trials. Cerebrovasc. Dis. 19,
65–68.
Dickens, B. M. (1999). Vulnerable per-
sons in biomedical research: 50 years
after the Nuremberg Code. J. Int.
Bioethique 10, 13–23.
Elkins, J. S., Khatabi, T., Fung, L.,
Rootenberg, J., and Johnston, S. C.
(2006). Recruiting subjects for acute
stroke trials: a meta-analysis. Stroke
37, 123–128.
Faden, R. R., Lederer, S. E., and
Moreno, J. D. (1996). US med-
ical researchers, the Nuremberg
doctors trial, and the Nuremberg
Code. A review of ﬁndings of
the advisory committee on human
radiation experiments. JAMA 276,
1667–1671.
Flaherty, M. L., Karlawish, J., Khoury,
J. C., Kleindorfer, D., Woo, D.,
and Broderick, J. P. (2008). How
important is surrogate consent
for stroke research? Neurology 71,
1566–1571.
Food and Drug Administration. (1996).
Protection of human subjects;
informed consent–FDA. Final rule.
Fed. Regist. 61, 51498–51533.
Goldstein, J. N., Espinola, J. A., Fisher,
J., Pallin, D. J., and Camargo, C. A.
(2010). Public opinion of a stroke
clinical trial using exception from
informed consent. Int. J. Emerg.
Med. 3, 385–389.
Grotta, J., and Bratina, P. (1995). Sub-
jective experiences of 24 patients
dramatically recovering from stroke.
Stroke 26, 1285–1288.
Halpern, S. D.,Karlawish, J. H.,Casarett,
D., Berlin, J. A., Townsend, R. R.,
andAsch,D.A. (2003).Hypertensive
patients’ willingness to participate
in placebo-controlled trials: implica-
tions for recruitment efﬁciency. Am.
Heart J. 146, 985–992.
Halpern, S. D., Metzger, D. S., Berlin,
J. A., and Ubel, P. A. (2001). Who
will enroll? Predicting participation
in a phase II AIDS vaccine trial.
J. Acquir. Immune Deﬁc. Syndr. 27,
281–288.
Iwanowski, P., Budaj, A., Czlonkowska,
A., Wasek, W., Kozlowska-Boszko,
B., Oledzka, U., and Maselbas, W.
(2008). Informed consent for clin-
ical trials in acute coronary syn-
dromes and stroke following the
European clinical trials directive:
investigators’ experiences and atti-
tudes. Trials 9, 45.
Kane, I., Lindley, R., Lewis, S., and
Sandercock, P. (2006). Impact
of stroke syndrome and stroke
severity on the process of con-
sent in the third international
stroke trial. Cerebrovasc. Dis. 21,
348–352.
Kasner, S. E., Baren, J. M., Le Roux, P.
D., Nathanson, P. G., Lamond, K.,
Rosenberg, S. L., and Karlawish, J.
(2010). Community views on neu-
rologic emergency treatment trials.
Ann. Emerg. Med. 57, 346–354.
Kasner,S. E.,DelGiudice,A.,Rosenberg,
S., Sheen, M., Luciano, J. M., Cuc-
chiara, B. L., Messe, S. R., Sansing,
L. H., and Baren, J. M. (2009). Who
will participate in acute stroke trials?
Neurology 72, 1682–1688.
Kilmarx, P. H., Ramjee, G., Kitayaporn,
D., and Kunasol, P. (2001). Pro-
tection of human subjects’ rights
in HIV-preventive clinical trials in
Africa andAsia: experiences and rec-
ommendations. AIDS 15(Suppl. 5),
S73–S79.
Kim, S. Y., and Karlawish, J. H. (2003).
Ethics and politics of research
involving subjects with impaired
decision-making abilities. Neurology
61, 1645–1646.
Kulynych, J., and Korn, D. (2002). The
effect of the new federal medical-
privacy rule on research. N. Engl. J.
Med. 346, 201–204.
Leira, E. C., Kaldjian, L. C., Lud-
wig, B. R., Torner, J. C., Olalde,
H. M., Hacke, W., and Adams,
H. P. Jr. (2010). Lack of inter-
national consensus on ethical
aspects of acute stroke tri-
als. J. Stroke Cerebrovasc. Dis.
doi:10.1016/j.jstrokecerebrovasdis.2
010.06.008. [Epub ahead of print].
Lynoe, N., Sandlund, M., Jacobsson, L.,
Nordberg, G., and Jin, T. (2004).
Informed consent in China: quality
of information provided to partici-
pants in a research project. Scand. J.
Public Health 32, 472–475.
Lynoe, N., Sandlund, M., Westberg, K.,
and Duchek, M. (1998). Informed
consent in clinical training – patient
experiences and motives for partici-
pating. Med. Educ. 32, 465–471.
Marshall, P. A. (2006). Informed con-
sent in international health research.
J. Empir. Res. Hum. Res. Ethics 1,
25–42.
Marwick, C. (1997). Assessment of
exception to informed consent.
JAMA 278, 1392–1393.
Morgenstern, L. B., Bartholomew, L.
K., Grotta, J. C., Staub, L., King,
M., and Chan, W. (2003). Sustained
beneﬁt of a community and profes-
sional intervention to increase acute
stroke therapy. Arch. Intern. Med.
163, 2198–2202.
Morris, M. C., Nadkarni, V. M., Ward,
F. R., and Nelson, R. M. (2004).
Exception from informed consent
for pediatric resuscitation research:
community consultation for a trial
of brain cooling after in-hospital
cardiac arrest. Pediatrics 114,
776–781.
National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. (1979). Protection of
human subjects; Belmont report:
notice of report for public comment.
Fed. Regist. 44, 23191–23197.
Prentice, E. D. (1999). Informed
consent: the most important
protector. Acad. Emerg. Med. 6,
774–775.
Salzman, J. G., Frascone, R. J., God-
ding, B. K., Provo, T. A., and Gert-
ner, E. (2007). Implementing emer-
gency research requiring exception
from informed consent, community
consultation, and public disclosure.
Ann. Emerg. Med. 50, 448–455; 455
e441–444.
Sanossian, N., Starkman, S., Eck-
stein, M., Stratton, S., Pratt, F.,
Conwit, R., and Saver, J. L.
(2010). Intercontinental elicitation
of informed consent for enrollment
in stroke research. Cerebrovasc. Dis.
30, 323–324.
Saver, J. L., Kidwell, C., Eckstein,
M., Ovbiagele, B., and Starkman,
S. (2006). Physician-investigator
phone elicitation of consent
in the ﬁeld: a novel method
to obtain explicit informed
consent for prehospital clinical
research. Prehosp. Emerg. Care 10,
182–185.
Saver, J. L., and The FAST-MAG
Investigators. (2011). Patient
versus proxy explicit informed
consent for enrollment in a pre-
hospital stroke treatment trial,
International Stroke Conference
Oral Presentations. Stroke 42,
e58.
Saver, R. S. (1996). Critical care research
and informed consent. North Carol.
Law Rev. 75, 205–271.
Schats, R., Brilstra, E. H., Rinkel, G. J.,
Algra, A., and Van Gijn, J. (2003).
Informed consent in trials for neu-
rological emergencies: the exam-
ple of subarachnoid haemorrhage.
J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatr. 74,
988–991.
Simmons, F. B. (1964). Regarding the
Nuremberg code. Arch. Otolaryngol.
80, 118–119.
The National Institute of Neurolog-
ical Disorders and Stroke Rt-PA
Stroke Study Group. (1995). Tis-
sue plasminogen activator for acute
ischemic stroke.N. Engl. J. Med. 333,
1581–1587.
Tu, J. V., Willison, D. J., Silver, F.
L., Fang, J., Richards, J. A., Lau-
pacis, A., and Kapral, M. K. (2004).
Impracticability of informed con-
sent in the registry of the Canadian
stroke network. N. Engl. J. Med. 350,
1414–1421.
World Medical Association. (2000).
Declaration of Helsinki: ethical
Frontiers in Neurology | Stroke October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 65 | 8
Rose and Kasner Consent in acute stroke trials
principles for medical research
involving human subjects. JAMA
284, 3043–3045.
World Medical Association. (2004).
Declaration of Helsinki: ethical
principles for medical research
involving human sub-
jects. J. Int. Bioethique 15,
124–129.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 16 August 2011; paper pending
published: 08 September 2011; accepted:
21 September 2011; published online: 17
October 2011.
Citation: Rose DZ and Kasner SE (2011)
Informed consent: the rate-limiting step
in acute stroke trials. Front. Neur. 2:65.
doi: 10.3389/fneur.2011.00065
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Stroke, a specialty of Frontiers in
Neurology.
Copyright © 2011 Rose and Kasner.
This is an open-access article subject
to a nonexclusive license between the
authors and Frontiers Media SA, which
permits use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the origi-
nal authors and source are credited and
other Frontiers conditions are complied
with.
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 65 | 9
